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Non-technical Summary 
Clusters play a central role in the spatial organization of some of the world's most 
dynamic and R&D intensive industries. Inspired by the exceptional performance of 
Silicon Valley and other leading high-tech clusters, local, regional and national 
governments have spent billions of dollars to promote the formation of similar clusters. 
Yet overall success rates were low, indicating that the forces behind these 
agglomeration processes are more subtle than thought of heretofore. 
In this paper, we take a step forward by linking firms' R&D investment incentives to 
their local economic environment, and then analyze how this, in turn, affects firms' 
location decisions. The questions addressed are: is there a relationship between 
agglomeration and the R&D intensity chosen and the type of R&D projects undertaken? 
Does the industry wide R&D portfolio change with the degree of agglomeration? What 
are the consequences of all this on firms' incentives to agglomerate and on the welfare 
benefits from agglomeration? 
Towards deriving answers to these questions, we extend Marshall’s labor pooling 
argument by introducing stochastic demand shocks arising from firms' R&D decisions.  
We show that upon agglomeration, firms tend to invest more in R&D and to choose 
R&D projects of higher risk as compared to spatially separated firms. Most 
interestingly, ex-ante identical firms generically choose asymmetric R&D strategies to 
avoid joint success and thus to reduce labor market competition. This contributes to a 
higher variance of R&D efforts in agglomerations. 
Turning to the welfare implications, our analysis shows that the agglomeration of firms 
is always the preferred industry outcome. The welfare superiority of a cluster relative to 
dispersed locations stems from two sources. First, successful innovations are 
implemented by more workers (a 'labor productivity effect'). Second, R&D programs 
are collectively better organized (an 'R&D portfolio effect'). The latter effect is the 
result of firms' endogenous choice of R&D strategy, and it represents a benefit of labor 
pooling that has not been discussed heretofore. 
Finally, we test the central prediction of the theory regarding the variance of R&D 
expenditures of firms in agglomerations and of firms in separate locations using firm 
level panel data from R&D intensive industries in Germany. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Clusterbildung - d.h. die räumliche Konzentration von Unternehmen der gleichen 
Branche - ist oftmals ein zentrales Kennzeichen von Sektoren, die sich durch eine 
besonders hohe Dynamik und FuE-Intensität auszeichnen. Angeregt durch die 
außergewöhnliche Entwicklung der Elektronik- und Softwareindustrie im Silicon 
Valley sowie durch andere Hightech-Cluster, haben sowohl lokale und regionale als 
auch nationale Regierungen große Beträge zur Förderung der Herausbildung ähnlicher 
Cluster in ihren Regionen ausgegeben. Der Erfolg blieb jedoch weitgehend aus, was 
darauf hindeutet, dass die Kräfte, die hinter sektoralen Agglomerationsprozessen stehen, 
wohl komplexer sind als von vielen gedacht.  
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Anreize für Unternehmen, in Forschung und 
Entwicklung (FuE) zu investieren in Abhängigkeit von ihrem lokalen Umfeld und 
analysiert wird, wie dadurch die Standortentscheidung von Unternehmen beeinflusst. 
Die Forschungsfragen lauten: Existiert eine Beziehung zwischen Clustern (d.h. der 
Agglomeration von Unternehmen der gleichen Branche innerhalb einer Region) und der 
FuE-Intensität sowie der Art der FuE-Tätigkeit von Unternehmen? Ändert sich das FuE-
Portfolio eines Sektors mit dem Ausmaß der Clusterbildung? Welche Auswirkungen 
haben Cluster und die Art und Intensität der sektoralen FuE-Tätigkeit auf die Anreize 
für Unternehmen, sich in Clustern anzusiedeln and was sind die Wohlfahrtseffekte von 
sektoralen Agglomerationen? 
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen erweitern wir das traditionelle Argument des 
Arbeitkräftepoolings von Marshall durch die Einführung von stochastischen 
Nachfrageshocks, die sich aus den FuE-Entscheidungen der Unternehmen ergeben. Wir 
zeigen, dass zusätzlich zum Arbeitkräftepooling-Effekt Unternehmen tendenziell mehr 
in FuE investieren und risikoträchtigere FuE-Projekte verfolgen als Unternehmen, die 
außerhalb von Agglomerationen angesiedelt sind. Unternehmen, die ex-ante identisch 
sind, wählen asymmetrische FuE-Strategien, um gemeinsamen Erfolg und damit 
direkten Wettbewerb im Arbeitsmarkt zu entgehen. Dadurch kommt es zu einer höheren 
Varianz der FuE-Aufwendungen in Agglomerationen. 
Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass Clusterbildung das von den Unternehmen bevorzugte 
Ergebnis ist. Die höheren Wohlfahrtseffekte von Clustern im Vergleich zu einer 
zerstreuten Ansiedlung von Unternehmen rührt seinerseits aus Produktivitätseffekten, 
da Innovationen von mehr Arbeitskräften genutzt werden können, und andererseits einer 
besseren kollektiven Organisation der FuE-Aktivitäten in Form eines ausgewogeneren 
FuE-Portfolios. Zweitgenannter Effekte resultiert aus den endogenen Entscheidungen 
der Unternehmen über ihre FuE-Strategie und spiegelt einen Nutzen des Arbeitskräfte-
Poolings wider, der in dieser Form in der Literatur noch nicht diskutiert wurde. 
Eine der zentralen Aussagen des theoretischen Modells, nämlich die höhere Varianz der 
FuE-Aufwendungen von Unternehmen in Agglomerationen im Vergleich zu 
Unternehmen an isolierten Standorten, wird mit Hilfe von Paneldaten zu Unternehmen 
in forschungsintensiven Industrien in Deutschland getestet.  
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Abstract
We investigate the interplay between firms’ R&D decisions and labor market competition,
and how this influences equilibrium location choices and welfare. Firms engage in risky
R&D activities and thus create stochastic product and implied labor demand. Spatial
agglomeration is more likely in situations where the innovation step is large and the
probability for a firm to be the only innovator is high. When firms agglomerate, they
tend to invest more in R&D compared to spatially dispersed firms. Agglomeration is
welfare maximizing, because expected labor productivity is higher and firms choose a
more eﬃcient, diversified portfolio of R&D projects at the industry level. The latter
aspect is ascertained by data from German firms in R&D intensive industries. (JEL: L13,
O32, R12)
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1 Introduction
Clusters play a central role in the spatial organization of some of the world’s most dynamic
and R&D intensive industries. The best known example is Silicon Valley that during the
nineties was home to 20 per cent of the world’s 100 biggest electronics and software companies
(Business Week, August 5, 1997). Other well-known examples are the biotech cluster in La
Jolla (California), the neuroscience cluster in Oxford (UK) and the automotive industry
cluster in the Stuttgart region (Germany). Audretsch and Feldman (1996) provide evidence
showing that firms in R&D intensive industries more than other firms tend to cluster their
innovative as well as their productive activities.
The success of some of these clusters has been remarkable. In spite of ups and downs in
employment during the nineties of the last century, the employment growth rate in Silicon
Valley outpaced with an impressive 15 per cent the U.S. national employment growth rate,
and the mean income was 50 per cent higher than the national figure (Audretsch, 1998).
The exceptional performance of Silicon Valley and other leading high-tech clusters has
promoted a worldwide interest in their replication. Billions of dollars were spent by local,
regional and national governments to promote the formation of such high-tech clusters. Yet
overall success rates were low, indicating that the forces behind these agglomeration processes
are more subtle than thought of heretofore.
In this paper, we intend to take a step forward by linking firms’ R&D investment incentives
to their local economic environment and then analyze how this, in turn, aﬀects firms’ location
decisions. To do so, we elaborate the labor pooling argument proposed first by Alfred Marshall
in his Principles (1920) and formalized afterwards by Krugman (1991a). Our model unveils
a new benefit of labor pooling and oﬀers novel, empirically verifiable predictions. The central
prediction, that the variance of firms’ R&D eﬀorts is larger in agglomerations, is shown to
be consistent with data from German firms in R&D intensive industries.
We consider a simple setup where two firms supply to a competitive world market. Firms
have access to a common technology that allows them to produce a basic quality, but un-
dertake risky R&D to improve on their product quality. The R&D shocks translate into
stochastic product, and therefore labor demands. Confronted with location decisions before
the outcome of these shocks becomes known, the firms decide to either locate separately in
small labor markets, or, followed by their labor pool, to jointly locate in a large labor market.
Firms may prefer separate locations in spite of the smaller labor supply, in order to enjoy
monopsony power in the labor markets and to avoid the competition for laborers that arises
under agglomeration.
We first look at a situation where innovations are the result of an exogenous R&D process.
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We show that agglomeration in a cluster only occurs if, after the realization of the R&D
shocks, firms are likely to end up in an asymmetric situation where one of the firms pulls
significantly ahead in the R&D race. If this outcome arises ex-post, the leading firm is able to
enjoy the large labor supply at relatively low wages, because competition in the labor market
from the lagging firm is weak. By contrast, if firms market products of similar qualities,
most of their profits are dissipated by labor market competition. Labor pooling has thus
two opposing eﬀects on profits. It allows the leading firm to expand its production, which
increases expected profits and constitutes the agglomerative force in our model. At the same
time, competition in the labor market dilutes profits, which works against agglomeration.
We then endogenize firms’ R&D investment and thereby, implicitly, the labor demand
shocks. Interestingly, upon agglomeration, ex-ante identical firms generically choose asym-
metric R&D strategies to avoid joint success and to reduce labor market competition. This
contributes to a higher variance of R&D eﬀorts in agglomerations.
The welfare analysis shows that within our framework agglomeration of firms is always
the preferred industry outcome. The superiority of a cluster relative to dispersed locations
in terms of welfare stems from two sources. Firstly, successful innovations are applied over a
larger base of workers due to a deeper labor pool (a ’labor productivity eﬀect’). Secondly,
agglomeration in a cluster allows for a better organization of R&D programs within the
industry (an ’R&D portfolio eﬀect’). The latter eﬀect is the result of firms’ endogenous
choice of R&D strategy, and it represents a benefit of labor pooling that has not been discussed
heretofore. The intuition is that if the firms locate together in a cluster and both experience
R&D success, one of the innovations represents wasteful duplication of R&D eﬀorts. The
asymmetric equilibrium strategies that reduce the likelihood of joint success increase thus
the eﬃciency of the R&D portfolio at the industry level by reducing duplication. Since there
are clear cut parameter regimes under which in equilibrium firms choose separate locations,
there is too much locational separation relative to the welfare optimum.
In his Principles, Marshall (1920) argued that firms enjoy a number of benefits when
locating in a cluster.1 Firstly, the high demand for intermediate inputs allows upstream
suppliers to achieve a higher degree of specialization, leading to a more eﬃcient division of
labor within the industry and lower prices due to decreasing marginal cost (Stigler, 1951;
Krugman, 1991b). Secondly, firms inside a cluster can share information and knowledge
which reflects itself as technology spillovers. There is ample empirical evidence suggesting
that firms’ productivity increases due to technology spillovers with increasing geographical
proximity (Acs et al., 1994; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Jaﬀe et al., 1993; summarized in
1See Duranton and Puga (2004) for an excellent survey of the microeconomics of clusters.
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Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). Recently, a number of authors have analyzed spillover driven
clustering from a theoretical perspective (Combes and Duranton, 2005; Fosfuri and Rønde,
2004; Saint-Paul, 2003).
Thirdly and finally, the concentration of firms attracts a ’deep’ pool of laborers, which
is the benefit from clustering we focus on in this paper. Marshall argued that firms have
incentives to locate in the same region when they face imperfectly correlated stochastic labor
demands. Firms blessed with high output and labor demand can draw workers at low cost
from a large local labor market pool. Labor pooling thus provides firms with a more elastic
labor supply and workers with more job security. Although labor pooling probably is the
agglomeration benefit that has received the least attention in the literature, empirical work
suggests that it plays an important role for firms’ location decisions. Indeed, Rosenthal and
Strange (2002) regress the Ellison-Glaeser index of spatial industry concentration (Ellison
and Glaeser, 1997) on proxies for the three above mentioned agglomeration benefits and find
that the evidence is strongest for the labor pooling argument. Dumais et al. (2002) reach a
similar conclusion in their study of the dynamics of agglomeration processes.
Marshall’s labor pooling argument was first formalized in a model by Krugman (1991a,
Ch. 2 and App. B). He analyzed location equilibria in a model with two locations and n firms
who produce under decreasing returns to scale and face exogenous firm-specific productivity
shocks. The analysis shows that large clusters provide greater labor pooling benefits than
smaller clusters, because the labor market is ’deeper’. The firms’ individual labor demands
aﬀect the equilibrium wage less in a deep market, which allows the most productive firms
to capture a larger share of the labor force. This results in higher profits and welfare, and
provides a push towards full agglomeration by firms and workers. Apart from Krugman
(1991a), Stahl and Walz (2001) is the only other formal model of labor pooling known to
us. Stahl and Walz introduce both firm-specific and sector-specific (exogenous) shocks and
analyze whether firms locate together with firms belonging to the same or to a diﬀerent sector.
There is also a small literature on firms’ location decisions relative to localized labor markets.
However, Topel (1986), Baumgardner (1988), or more recently Picard and Toulemonde (2000)
all focus on issues diﬀerent from ours, such as workers’ migration incentives, the division of
labor as changing with labor market size, and asymmetric agglomeration as the result of
minimum wages, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our baseline
model of labor pooling with exogenous R&D strategies. At the end of this section, we
relate in more detail our setup and results to Krugman’s labor pooling model. In Section
3, we endogenize R&D investment decisions and derive and characterize the equilibria of
4
the game. Section 4 contains our empirical analysis, in which, by combining German data
from various sources, we show that indeed R&D expenditures of firms vary significantly
more in agglomerations than under separation even after controlling for the most important
confounding eﬀects. We conclude by discussing implications of our analysis and possible
extensions. All relevant proofs are relegated to the first Appendix.
2 A Simple Model of Labor Pooling
2.1 The Model Set-Up
There are two firms 1 and 2, and two locations. The firms produce with a one-to-one produc-
tion function, so that Li units of labor employed by firm i at wage wi result in the identical
output quantity yi. With respect to their output, the firms are price takers in a world market.
The price obtained depends on the quality of the product. For simplicity, we assume that
the price pi fetched by firm i is equal to the quality of its product qi.2 The firms’ marginal
production cost net of wages is normalized to zero, and fixed costs are sunk.
The firms are initially endowed with a technology to produce a good of quality v. They
may benefit from the stochastic outcome of their R&D eﬀort that for the moment is costless.
If the R&D project is successful, the product’s quality is increased to v + ∆, with ∆ > 0.
If it is unsuccessful, the firm has to produce the initial quality. In this section, we assume
the simplest possible R&D process, with exogenous and independent success probability ρ
for each firm.
In specifying labor supply, we follow the simple approach taken by Krugman (1991a).
There is an economy wide mass of L identical workers with industry-specific skills. Before
accepting a job, laborers are perfectly mobile between the two locations. However, once
settled in one region, the costs of migration become prohibitive.3 The workers are risk-
neutral and choose the location maximizing their expected wage. The opportunity wage
outside the industry for the workers is u < v, i.e. industry production is eﬃcient with the
initial product quality.
The firms simultaneously choose their location. We consider two alternative outcomes of
the location subgame: the outcome in which firms locate together is dubbed ’agglomeration’,
and the outcome in which firms locate separately is dubbed ’separation’. If the firms ag-
glomerate, they compete in wages for the skilled workers in the region. Firms simultaneously
2This price would also be obtained if the two firms were monopolists in their respective market and N ≥ L
consumers endowed with a utility function of U = q − p would buy at most one unit of the good.
3 Introducing non-prohibitive ex-post migration costs would not aﬀect the qualitative nature of our results.
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set wages and workers choose either the firm oﬀering the higher wage, or take the outside
opportunity. In case of a tie at a wage that is preferred to the outside option, workers split
equally across the firms. If the firms choose separate locations, they behave as monopsonists
in their respective local labor market.
The timing of the game is as follows: 1) firms choose their location, 2) workers locate,
3) R&D outcomes are realized, 4) firms set wages and workers are hired, and 5) production
takes place and profits are realized. Our timing reflects that location decisions involve a longer
term commitment relative to R&D decisions, which in turn are less flexible than allocation
decisions involving wages.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Suppose that firms have chosen separate locations. As each firm is a monopsonist in its
local labor market, workers are paid a wage that matches their outside opportunity u, and
this independently of the R&D outcome. Therefore, ex-ante, workers are indiﬀerent between
settling in the two regions, and the expected local labor supply is L/2. Then, firm i’s expected
profits under separation are
E(πSi ) = ρ(v +∆− u)
L
2
+ (1− ρ)(v − u)L
2
(1)
=
L
2
(v − u+ ρ∆).
Obviously, the firms’ profits increase in the number of workers available, as well as in the
expected product quality net of the minimum wage, u.
Suppose now that firms have agglomerated in one region. The wage resulting from firms’
competition in the labor market depends on the outcome of the R&D process of both firms.
Lemma 1 Consider the labor market equilibrium when firms agglomerate.
i) If both firms produce at the same quality q ≥ v, then the equilibrium wages are w∗i = w∗j = q.
Firms make no profit.
ii) If firm i produces at quality v+∆ and firm j at quality v, then the equilibrium wages are
w∗i = v+ ε and w
∗
j = v, respectively. All workers supply to firm i. Firm i’s profit per worker
is ∆, and firm j makes no profit.
Hence under agglomeration the firms’ competition for labor shifts rents to the workers. No
matter whether both firms have innovated or not, all profits are competed away in the labor
market when product qualities are symmetric. By contrast, when only one firm innovates,
the successful firm drives the low quality firm out of the market and employs all available
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workers at a wage above the workers’ outside opportunity. The expected profits of firm i
under agglomeration are therefore
E(πAi ) = ρ(1− ρ)∆L. (2)
Profits increase in the probability that only one firm is successful, ρ(1 − ρ), in the size of
the labor pool, and in the innovation step. Workers in the cluster receive a wage of v +∆
if both firms innovate and of v otherwise. Their expected wage of v + ρ2∆ always exceeds
the opportunity wage they would earn in the other location. Therefore, all workers with
industry-specific skills prefer to co-locate with the two agglomerating firms.
In the first stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose their location on the basis of
expected profits. Comparing (1) and (2), the Nash equilibrium in locations is summarized in
Proposition 1 Agglomeration is the unique location outcome if ρ < 1/2 and
∆ ≥ e∆ ≡ v − u
ρ(1− 2ρ) . (3)
Otherwise, separation is the unique outcome.
The profits of a firm can come from two sources: the basic product quality available at
the industry level and firm specific product innovation. Under separation, both the basic
product quality and the innovation contribute to expected profits. Under agglomeration,
however, successful innovation is the only source of rents, because the profits that could
accrue from the basic product quality are competed away in the labor market. Hence, a
necessary condition for agglomeration to be the preferred option is that the expected profits
from successful innovation eﬀorts must be greater than under separation, which is guaranteed
by the minimum condition on ∆.
Explaining the location trade-oﬀ in a diﬀerent way, agglomeration has two opposing eﬀects
on profits. On the one hand, it induces the formation of a large labor pool. Therefore, the
firm with the higher product quality can expand its production more than under separation,
which increases expected profits. This is the agglomerative force. On the other hand, wages
increase via tougher competition for workers. Wage competition under agglomeration thus
constitutes the deglomerative force in the model.
Keeping these two forces in mind, the comparative statics of the model are easily under-
stood. Under agglomeration a firm is only able to hire workers at a profitable rate if it pulls
ahead in the R&D race and makes its workers more productive than the rival’s. Consequently,
agglomeration is more profitable if the innovation step, i.e. the productivity advantage of the
winning firm, is large. Agglomeration is also more likely if the R&D hazard rate is neither
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too low (which would render innovation unlikely) nor too high (which would render likely
simultaneous innovation by both firms). The ∆−threshold of Proposition 1 takes its mini-
mum value at a hazard rate of 1/4, and separation equilibrium always obtains for ρ ≥ 1/2.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, wage competition under agglomeration
destroys all rents to firms from the initial technology. Thus, separation becomes the more
attractive the higher is v − u. This can also be seen from Figure 1 where the region of the
parameter space for which agglomeration is the equilibrium outcome is smaller for the higher
value of v − u.
1/4 1/2 1
ρ
Δ
agglomeration
separation
'uv' for Δ −~
''u'v' for Δ −~
Figure 1: Location equilibrium with exogenous R&D success probabilities for two diﬀerent
values of v − u, (v − u)0 < (v − u)00.
Turning to a welfare comparison, we have that expected social surplus, the sum of workers’
rents and firms’ profits, is maximized when firms agglomerate. Under agglomeration all
available labor produces the higher quality good if at least one of the firms is successful in
R&D. Under separation this is possible only if both firms are successful. Agglomeration has
therefore the advantage over separation that workers are always put to their most productive
use. We will refer to this agglomeration benefit as the ’labor productivity eﬀect ’. The welfare
implication of the location equilibrium in Proposition 1 is straightforward. There is (weakly)
too little agglomeration in equilibrium.
Our benchmark model represents essentially a simplified version of Krugman’s labor pool-
ing model. First, we assume two rather than n firms. The locational choice is therefore
reduced to either full agglomeration or separation. Second, the firms operate under constant
rather than decreasing returns to scale in our model, which leaves labor pooling as the only
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source of profits under agglomeration. Finally, R&D shocks have a two-point distribution
instead of the uniform distribution assumed by Krugman. Only in the labor market do we
consider a slightly more complicated set-up by assuming imperfect rather than perfect com-
petition. The simplifying assumptions are advantageous both in terms of presentation and
further analysis. First and foremost, they provide us with a framework that lends itself to
model endogenous R&D and to explore the interaction between location and innovation. At
the same time the assumptions highlight the importance of firm-level asymmetries for labor
pooling, an issue fairly hidden in Krugman’s model.
Albeit simpler, the benchmark model contains most of the central eﬀects at play in Krug-
man’s model. In both models the agglomerative force is the ’labor productivity eﬀect’: labor
pooling increases expected productivity and profits by allowing the more productive firms to
expand their output. Unlike our analysis, Krugman finds full agglomeration as the unique
equilibrium outcome. Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) point out that the apparent lack of a
deglomerative force is due to Krugman’s treatment of firms as price takers in the labor mar-
ket. Once the firms take into account that their location decision aﬀects local wages through
the labor market competition, a deglomerative force similar to the one in our model is in-
troduced. Ellison and Fudenberg show that this results in a multiplicity of equilibria where
equilibria with full agglomeration and equilibria with firms and workers in both possible
locations coexist.
As to the Krugman model, notice finally that it has a scale eﬀect of agglomeration not
present in our model with only two firms. In the Krugman model the benefit from labor
pooling increases in the size of the agglomeration for a given ratio of workers to firms. The
intuition is that the realized productivity of an individual firm has a smaller impact on the
average productivity in larger agglomerations with more firms. Since the local wage is de-
termined by the average productivity, the covariance between individual firm productivity
and wage is reduced. As a result, firms blessed with a high productivity shock will expand
production more. This leads to higher firm productivity as well as profits in larger agglom-
erations with many firms and workers; an eﬀect that pushes towards full agglomeration in
equilibrium.
Before extending our model to endogenous R&D decisions, we should remark that the
benchmark model can be reinterpreted as a dynamic R&D model with catching-up in tech-
nology. Consider an infinite horizon model in discrete time where firms and workers choose
their locations at the beginning of the game. Innovations occur in discrete jumps (maxi-
mally one per period) along a ’quality ladder’ à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) of the type
qi = (1+∆)qi−1. If one firm pulls ahead in a period, the laggard catches up before the begin-
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ning of the next period. That is, firms start the following period with equal qualities. It can
be shown that such a dynamic R&D race produces the same threshold e∆ as in Proposition
1.
3 Endogenous R&D Investment
In the benchmark model firms’ location decisions were driven by exogenous shocks. These
shocks were referred to as innovations, but they could equally well be interpreted as demand
shocks. In this and the following section we take seriously the former interpretation, and
endogenize the shocks by explicitly modeling firms’ R&D investment. This allows us to bring
together two aspects heretofore not considered together, namely the choice of location, and
research strategy. The aim is to analyze the interplay between labor market competition
and R&D decisions and how this, in turn, influences equilibrium location choices and welfare
conclusions.
3.1 Model with R&D Investment
In the baseline model, R&D was characterized by two exogenous parameters, ρ, the prob-
ability of a successful innovation, and ∆, its size. Without alluding to specific examples it
is diﬃcult to say whether R&D investment aﬀects ρ, ∆, or both. We therefore start from a
fairly general R&D technology and then look at two focal, parameterized examples.
Returning to the specification of a general R&D technology, let firm i choose an R&D
intensity φi resulting in a probability of success ρ(φi) and an innovation size ∆(φi). Both
ρ(φi) and ∆(φi) are C2-functions. Let ρ(·), ∆(·) > 0 for φi > 0 and ρ0(·), ∆0(·) ≥ 0 with
at least one strictly positive slope. The cost of employing φi is specified by the increasing
C2-function g(φi) where g(0) = g0(0) = 0 and g00(·) > 0. It is assumed that g(·) is suﬃciently
convex so that the profit function of firm i is concave for φi < φj and for φi > φj , and that
corner solutions are excluded.4
3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Towards an analysis of this extended model, suppose that in the first stage of the game the
firms have chosen separate locations. The expected profit of firm i is now given by
πS(φi) = ρ(φi)(v − u+∆(φi))L/2 + (1− ρ(φi))(v − u)L/2− g(φi).
4By this we suppose that the profit function is piecewise concave but not necessarily globally concave.
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The optimal research intensity φS,∗ solves the first-order condition
ρ0(φS,∗)∆(φS,∗)L/2 + ρ(φS,∗)∆0(φS,∗)L/2− g0(φS,∗) = 0. (4)
Suppose now instead that firms have chosen to agglomerate. In this case, equilibrium
wages in the labor market depend on the outcome of the stochastic R&D processes. A firm
can draw all workers from the labor pool if its R&D project is the only successful one in
the industry. With ∆0(φ) > 0 the firm investing more aims for a higher product quality
and employs all skilled laborers in the event that both firms’ R&D projects are successful.
Therefore, the expected profit of any firm i can be written as:
πAi (φi, φj) = ρ(φi)(1− ρ(φj))∆(φi)L− g(φi)+(
0 if φi ≤ φj ,
ρ(φi)ρ(φj)(∆(φi)−∆(φj))L otherwise.
Without loss of generality, suppose that φi ≤ φj . The first-order condition for the low-
investment firm i is
(1− ρ(φA,∗j ))
h
ρ0(φA,∗i )∆(φ
A,∗
i ) + ρ(φ
A,∗
i )∆
0(φA,∗i )
i
L− g0(φA,∗i ) = 0, (5)
while for the high-investment firm j it ish
ρ0(φA,∗j )∆(φ
A,∗
j ) + ρ(φ
A,∗
j )∆
0(φA,∗j )− ρ0(φ
A,∗
j )ρ(φ
A,∗
i )∆(φ
A,∗
i )
i
L− g0(φA,∗j ) = 0. (6)
It is easy to verify that the firms’ R&D investment choices are strategic substitutes.5
Specifically, an increase in one firm’s R&D investment reduces the marginal value of the
other firm’s investment by decreasing the probability of having the only successful R&D
project. Also, for the higher investment firm j, investment by firm i decreases profits by
reducing firm j’s eﬃciency advantage in case both firms are successful.
The following proposition characterizes the R&D equilibrium under agglomeration.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g(·) is suﬃciently convex, and consider the equilibrium in R&D
investment strategies (φA,∗i , φ
A,∗
j ) when firms agglomerate.
(i) If ∆0(φA,∗) = 0, then there exists a unique, symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium, φA,∗i =
φA,∗j = φ
A,∗ in which the equilibrium investment satisfies
(1− ρ(φA,∗))ρ0(φA,∗)∆(φA,∗)L− g0(φA,∗) = 0. (7)
(ii) If ∆0(φA,∗) > 0, then there exists a generically unique pure-strategy equilibrium with
φA,∗i < φ
A,∗
j in which the equilibrium investment levels satisfy (5) and (6).
5Check that for two firms with φi ≤ φj it holds that ∂2πAi (φi, φj)/(∂φi∂φj) = ∂2πAj (φi, φj)/(∂φj∂φi) =
−ρ0(φj)(ρ0(φi)∆(φi) + ρ(φi)∆0(φi)) < 0.
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The equilibrium in investment strategies conditional upon firms’ agglomeration exhibits
some interesting properties. Specifically, as long as ∆(·) is a strictly increasing function,
the ex-ante symmetric firms choose asymmetric R&D investments. The reason is that the
marginal return to R&D investment increases discretely as a firm’s investment becomes larger
than its competitor’s. The firm then produces a higher quality than its competitor when
both firms are successful and wins the labor market bid for skilled laborers, which in turn
increases the marginal return to R&D.6 This induces firms to optimally diﬀerentiate their
R&D strategies. The high investment firm benefits from a higher probability and a higher
innovation step, which provides it with full access to the labor pool in case of joint R&D
success. By contrast, the low investment firm is better oﬀ saving on R&D expenditures, even
if it only gains access to the entire labor pool in situations where it is the sole innovator.
Notwithstanding this optimal diﬀerentiation of R&D strategies, it is easy to show that, in
equilibrium, the high investment firm j has higher expected profits than firm i.7 Finally, it is
worth emphasizing that Proposition 2 implies both generic existence and uniqueness (modulo
firm identity) of a pure-strategy R&D equilibrium even within a fairly general functional form
setup of the R&D technology.8
The empirical implication of our analysis of the firms’ R&D decision is that the variance
of R&D expenditures is higher under agglomeration than that under separation. In section 4
we test this hypothesis using German data on firm-level R&D expenditures in R&D intensive
industries.
Now consider the determination of equilibrium location choices. In our baseline model
firms’ expected profits under agglomeration are identical, since ρ and ∆ are the same for both
firms. This yields a simple solution to the locational choice problem in the first stage of our
game, as firms always agree on whether to locate jointly or separately. With endogenous R&D
investment, firms generically diﬀerentiate their R&D strategies as described in Proposition
2. This leaves us with two pure-strategy equilibria in the agglomeration subgame which are
identical in every aspect except for the identity of the firm with the higher investment level,
6Note, however, that the firm’s payoﬀ remains continuous at this investment level, because the profit margin
(price - wage) reflects the diﬀerence in product quality.
7Verify that ∂πAi (φi, φj)/∂φj < 0. Using this, the fact that φ
A,∗
i < φ
A,∗
j , and a revealed preference
argument, we have that πAi (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ) < π
A
i (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
i ) = π
A
j (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
i ) ≤ πAj (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ).
8 In order to show this, we link the equilibrium and welfare analysis via the first-order conditions. We show
that if g(·) is suﬃciently convex, there exists a unique solution to the welfare problem, implying that a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Note that existence of a Nash equilibrium (at least in mixed strategies)
could be guaranteed without assumptions on g(·), by just imposing an upper limit on φi. This makes the
strategy set compact and the existence theorem of Glicksberg (1952) would apply.
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and thus, higher equilibrium profits. With the usual equilibrium selection criteria like Pareto
dominance or risk dominance we are unable to distinguish between these two equilibria.
As long as both firms prefer either agglomeration or separation no matter which equi-
librium is played, we can continue to assume that the firms reach their preferred location
outcome. However, asymmetric profit levels under agglomeration introduce the possibility
that the high investment firm prefers agglomeration whereas the low investment firm prefers
separation.
This issue can be dealt with in several ways. First suppose that firms know their (relative)
R&D investment level in an agglomeration before choosing location, i.e. they know which
equilibrium would be played. In this case if say firm i prefers agglomeration whereas firm j
prefers separation, then firms end up in a mixed strategy equilibrium in location. In such
an equilibrium each firm randomizes 50:50 across the locations, and agglomeration occurs in
equilibrium with probability 1/2. A second alternative is to assume that there is uncertainty
concerning the equilibrium of the agglomeration subgame. The two equilibria are equally
likely to arise, and the firms do not know which equilibrium is the relevant one when choosing
locations. The firms’ expected profits are thus symmetric and the location choice can be
analyzed as before.9 Formally, the assumption is that firms under agglomeration use a public
randomization device, i.e. firms condition their R&D on a public signal (for example, media
coverage of one of the firms) that selects one of the two equilibria with probability 1/2. Then,
agglomeration is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if
πAi (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ) + π
A
j (φ
A,∗
j , φ
A,∗
i ) ≥ 2πS(φS,∗). (8)
It is not crucial for our analysis how the location outcome is determined when the firms
disagree on the location choice ex-post. Indeed, the following propositions are formulated in
such a way that they do not rely on the specific assumption made here. Rather than choosing
one of the assumptions, we will use the examples to illustrate the equilibrium outcome for
the two assumptions discussed above.
The next proposition compares equilibrium investments under separation and agglomer-
ation and further characterizes the location equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Compare R&D investments and expected profits from innovation under the
two location choices:
(i) In a symmetric equilibrium, ρ(φA,∗) < 1/2 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for both
9This approach reflects the idea that location decisions are longer-term than R&D decisions. At the location
stage there is thus uncertainty not only concerning R&D outcomes but also concerning how R&D competition
will take place.
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firms to invest more in and to earn higher profits from R&D under agglomeration than under
separation.
(ii) In an asymmetric equilibrium with φA,∗i < φ
A,∗
j , ρ(φ
A,∗
j ) < 1/2 is a suﬃcient condition
for both firms to invest more in and to earn higher profits from R&D under agglomeration
than under separation.
(iii) Consider an equilibrium where firm j earns higher expected profits from R&D under
agglomeration than under separation. Furthermore, firm j earns weakly higher profits from
R&D under agglomeration than firm i does. Then, there exist two threshold levels ψi and ψj
such that firm i (firm j) prefers agglomeration if and only if v−u < ψi (v−u < ψj), ψj ≥ ψi
and ψj > 0. Separation and agglomeration are the equilibrium outcomes for v − u ≥ ψj and
for v − u < ψi, respectively.
(iv) Consider an equilibrium where both firms earn higher profits from R&D under separation
than under agglomeration. Then, separation is the equilibrium outcome.
Points (i) and (ii) of the proposition reflect the trade-oﬀ between innovating for a labor
pool of half the size under separation versus the dissipation of rents from innovation under
agglomeration due to labor market competition. A firm invests more in R&D under agglom-
eration and has higher expected profits from innovation if the equilibrium hazard rate of its
competitor is less than 1/2. A low hazard rate of the competitor stimulates own investment in
R&D, because the rents from successful innovation are less likely to be competed away in the
labor market. Though the conditions ρ(φA,∗) < 1/2 and ρ(φA,∗j ) < 1/2 refer to endogenous
rather than exogenous parameters,10 it is clear that these conditions hold in equilibrium when
it is not feasible or too expensive to increase the hazard rate beyond 1/2, i.e. lim ρ(φ) < 1/2
as φ→∞, or g(φ)→∞ as φ→ ρ−1(1/2). This will be illustrated in more detail in Example
I below.
As detailed in the discussion of the baseline model in section 2, expected profits under
separation are composed of the certain profits from the basic technology and the expected
profits from innovation. Under agglomeration innovation is the only source of profits. Thus,
for agglomeration to be preferred, the profits from innovation must not only be greater
under agglomeration than under separation, but the basic technology must also not be too
profitable. Point (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 3 give precision to this argument. Point (iii)
and (iv) characterize the location choices, except when firm j prefers agglomeration but firm
i prefers separation. Using the notation of Proposition 3, the firms prefer diﬀerent location
outcomes when ψi ≤ v − u < ψj . As explained above, this case can arise when the firms are
10We have formulated them this way in order to preserve the comparability of the results with those derived
in the other model versions.
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not equally likely to obtain the role as the high investment firm under agglomeration. We
return to this issue in example II that consider asymmetric equilibria in the agglomeration
subgame.
3.3 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare properties of the equilibrium characterized in the previous section.
Under separation the firms operate as monopsonists and appropriate all local rents. From
this it follows directly that conditional upon locational separation, the equilibrium R&D
intensities maximize total welfare.
The welfare analysis is more involved under agglomeration because there are competing
eﬀects at play. Firms no longer capture all rents accruing from their R&D investment, as
some of these rents go to the workers in the form of higher wages. This tends to reduce
incentives to invest in R&D below the welfare maximizing level. At the same time, however,
there is a strategic eﬀect at play. A firm does not internalize the negative eﬀect its R&D
investment has on the competitor’s profits, which pushes towards overinvestment in R&D.
A priori, it is unclear how these eﬀects play out and whether there is underinvestment or
overinvestment in R&D.
Aggregate welfare is specified by
WA(φi, φj) =
£
v − u+ ρ(φj)∆(φj) + ρ(φi)(1− ρ(φj))∆(φi)
¤
L− g(φi)− g(φj).
Suppose that WA(φi, φj) is globally concave in φi and φj for φi ≤ φj , which holds if g(·) is
suﬃciently convex. Then it is easy to verify that the first-order conditions characterizing the
welfare maximizing R&D intensities are identical to (5) and (6). Hence the R&D intensities
chosen by the firms in equilibrium are welfare maximizing, i.e. the two eﬀects leading to
underinvestment and overinvestment, respectively, cancel out each other. More precisely, the
expected contribution of firm i to social welfare is E[Max{qi−qj , 0}L−g(φi)], which is equal
to firm i’s expected profit. Therefore, the firm has the correct incentive to invest in quality
improvement. Although interesting, we do not wish to over-emphasize this result as it clearly
represents a knife’s edge case. Changes in the specification of the model, for example in the
mode of competition in labor or output markets, could aﬀect the relative strength of the
two opposing eﬀects. As a result, equilibrium R&D investments would no longer be welfare
optimal.
The next proposition summarizes the welfare analysis of R&D investments and assesses
the eﬃciency of location choices.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that g(·) is suﬃciently convex such that the welfare function is glob-
ally concave in φi and φj for φi ≤ φj. Then
(i) conditional upon locations, firms choose the welfare maximizing R&D intensities,
(ii) welfare is maximized when firms agglomerate.
Towards assessing the eﬃciency of the location equilibrium, it is useful to decompose the
welfare diﬀerence between agglomeration and separation into two eﬀects, an R&D portfolio
eﬀect and a labor productivity eﬀect,
WA(ρA,∗i , ρ
A,∗
j )−WS(ρS,∗, ρS,∗) =
WA(ρA,∗i , ρ
A,∗
j )−WA(ρS,∗, ρS,∗)| {z }
R&D portfolio eﬀect
+WA(ρS,∗, ρS,∗)−WS(ρS,∗, ρS,∗)| {z }
Labor productivity eﬀect
The labor productivity eﬀect captures the welfare benefit of agglomeration for given R&D
strategies. As discussed in section 2.2, this eﬀect is positive because under agglomeration
the firm with higher product quality can expand production by hiring all workers. The R&D
portfolio eﬀect represents an additional welfare benefit of agglomeration that arises because
labor pooling allows for a more eﬃcient, diversified R&D portfolio at the industry level.11 To
the best of our knowledge, the R&D portfolio eﬀect is novel to the labor pooling literature.
The major diﬀerence between the equilibrium R&D strategies under the two locational
choices is that firms choose asymmetric R&D investments under agglomeration, but symmet-
ric R&D investments under separation. To see why asymmetric investments lead to a more
eﬃcient R&D portfolio, suppose that firms would choose symmetric investment levels. Then,
if both firms were successful, the R&D investment of one of the firms would be wasted, i.e.
would not contribute to welfare. Notice that this is not the case under separation as the firms
do not share a common pool of workers. Keeping total investments constant but allocating
them asymmetrically reduces the problem of wasteful R&D duplication under agglomeration.
The investment of the low quality firm is still wasted if the high quality firm is successful.
However, since the low quality firm invests less compared to the situation of symmetric in-
vestments, that waste is reduced. Of course, this argument provokes the question of why it
would not be eﬃcient to allocate all investment to one firm to avoid duplication altogether.
The reason is that there are decreasing returns to R&D investment at the firm level. Thus
the allocation of R&D investment trades oﬀ the cost of asymmetric R&D investments due to
decreasing returns to scale, against the cost of wasteful duplication of R&D eﬀorts.12
11Since in equilibrium firms choose the welfare maximizing R&D investments, we have immediately that
WA(ρA,∗i , ρ
A,∗
j ) ≥WA(ρS,∗, ρS,∗).
12Put diﬀerently, starting from a situation of symmetric investments, a small reallocation of investments
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While the welfare optimality of R&D investments rests on the specific assumptions made
here, this appears not to be the case for the two eﬀects underlying Proposition 4 (ii). The
labor productivity eﬀect relies on the more productive firm hiring more workers than the less
productive firm under agglomeration. All reasonable specifications of labor market competi-
tion would yield this outcome, so this eﬀect is clearly robust to diﬀerent specifications of the
model. The R&D portfolio eﬀect arises, because firms have an interest in avoiding situations
where joint R&D success cannibalizes the profits from innovation. Joint success is also un-
desirable from the point of view of social welfare, because it entails wasteful duplication of
R&D eﬀorts. As public and private interests are aligned on this matter, it seems likely that
the R&D portfolio eﬀect will remain positive for minor changes in the model.
In order to gain additional insights into the link between R&D strategies and location
decisions, we have constructed two examples involving specific functions for ρ(·), ∆(·), and
g(·) so that the model could be solved in closed-form. We consider the two extreme cases,
one where R&D investment increases only ρ, and another where it only increases ∆.
3.4 Example I: Endogenous Hazard Rate
In this example, we consider a setup where firms choose the probability of achieving an
innovation of constant size ∆. In particular, suppose that ρ(φ) = φ and g(φ) = γφ2/2 where
γ measures the marginal cost of R&D. We assume that γ > ∆L/2, to exclude corner solutions.
The equilibrium is derived in the same manner as above, so details are left out.
Since investment does not increase the innovation step, there is a symmetric equilibrium
also when firms choose to agglomerate. The investment in R&D per firm is φS,∗ = ∆L/2γ
and φA,∗ = ∆L/(∆L+ γ) under separation and agglomeration, respectively. This results in
equilibrium profits
πSi (φ
S,∗) =
(v − u)L
2
+
∆2L2
8γ
,
πAi (φ
A,∗, φA,∗) =
γ∆2L2
2(∆L+ γ)2
.
In this example, the location decision can be treated as in the benchmark model. Com-
paring profits under agglomeration and separation, we find that firms agglomerate in the first
stage if and only if
πAi (φ
A,∗, φA,∗) ≥ πSi (φS,∗)⇔ ψj = ψi ≡ ψ =
∆2L(γ −∆L)(3γ +∆L)
4γ(γ +∆L)2
> v − u. (9)
from one firm to the other will result in a second-order reduction in R&D eﬃciency due to decreasing returns to
scale but in a first-order reduction in R&D duplication. Therefore, the welfare maximizing R&D investments
are asymmetric under agglomeration.
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In Figure 2 equation (9) is plotted in (γ,∆)-space. Notice that in this example the con-
dition ρ(φA,∗) < 1/2 from Proposition 3 (i) is equivalent to γ > ∆L. This implies that for
all parameter values above the γ = ∆L-line, firms invest more in R&D under agglomeration
than under separation, and the profits from innovation are higher when firms cluster. How-
ever, this must be weighed against the profits obtained under separation from producing the
baseline product.
Since we can explicitly determine the relevant equilibrium values, it is easier to see the
connection to the benchmark model of section 2 than in the more general setup. In particular,
firms agglomerate also in this example if two conditions are met: i) ρ(φA,∗) is intermediate
between 0 and 1/2, and ii) ∆ is suﬃciently large compared to v − u. The first condition is
violated if the marginal cost of R&D, γ, is either too low or too high.
agglomeration
separation
Δ
γ
γ = L Δ
eq. (9)
Figure 2: Location equilibria with endogenous hazard rate.
3.5 Example II: Endogenous Innovation Size
Suppose now that firms choose the innovation step so that ∆(φ) = φ whereas the probability
of success is constant, ρ(φ) = ρ. Let the marginal cost of adding to the innovation size be
quadratic as in the previous example.
With separate locations both firms choose the R&D intensity φS,∗ = ρL/2γ. The equilib-
rium profits are
πSi (φ
S,∗) =
(v − u)L
2
+
ρ2L2
8γ
.
Under agglomeration equilibrium R&D intensities are asymmetric since∆(φ) is increasing
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in φ. Solving the first-order conditions, we find φA,∗i = (1 − ρ)ρL/γ and φ
A,∗
j = ρL/γ. The
more R&D intensive firm j, which produces the highest quality, increases its investment with
higher success probability ρ. By contrast, the less R&D intensive firm i invests the most
when the probability of being successful alone is maximized, i.e. at ρ = 1/2. Note also that
firm j invests as much in R&D as the two firms together under separation. The resulting
profits under agglomeration are
πAi (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ) =
(1− ρ)2ρ2L2
2γ
,
πAj (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ) =
ρ2L2(1− 2ρ(1− ρ))
2γ
.
Suppose that the firms know the equilibrium outcome under agglomeration. Then, firm
i prefers agglomeration if and only if
v − u ≤ ρ
2L
4γ
¡
3− 8ρ+ 4ρ2
¢
=: ψi, (10)
and firm j prefers agglomeration if and only if
v − u ≤ ρ
2L
4γ
¡
3− 8ρ+ 8ρ2
¢
=: ψj . (11)
If the equilibrium under agglomeration is determined after the locations are chosen, and
the two equilibria are equally likely to be played, the firms agglomerate if and only if
v − u ≤ ρ
2L
4γ
¡
3− 8ρ+ 6ρ2
¢
=: ψ. (12)
The equilibrium outcome is depicted in (v−u, ρ)-space in Figure 3. Firm i makes highest
profits under agglomeration if and only if v − u is below ψi in (10). Notice that this can
only occur for ρ < 1/2 where agglomeration results in higher profits from R&D. The high
investment firm always earns higher profits from R&D under agglomeration. Since expected
profits are increasing more rapidly in ρ under agglomeration than under separation, the
threshold value of v − u below which firms agglomerate, ψj in (11), is also increasing in ρ.
For values of v−u above ψj (the white area) and below ψi (the dark grey area), the firms
agree on separation and agglomeration, respectively. In the rest of the parameter space (the
light grey area), firm j earns more profits under agglomeration but firm i earns less. Here,
as discussed above, the outcome depends on the specific assumptions made at the location
stage. If the firms know which equilibrium will be played under agglomeration, simultaneous
location choices result in a mixed strategy equilibrium where agglomeration is the outcome
with a probability 1/2. If instead the firms are equally likely to become the high investment
firm under agglomeration, there is separation above the dotted line in Figure 3, representing
ψ in (12), and agglomeration below.
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1/2 1
ψi: low-investment firm
condition (10)
ψ: condition (12)
ψj: high-investment firm
condition (11)
Figure 3: Location equilibria with endogenous innovation size
4 The Variance of R&D Expenditures by Location: Evidence
from German Firms
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that local labor market competition for skilled
workers induces firms to choose a more diversified R&D portfolio at the industry level. If
this is true then, ceteris paribus, it should hold that the variance of R&D expenditures of
firms in agglomerations is higher than the variance of R&D expenditure of firms in separate
locations. In this section, we test this relationship using firm level panel data from R&D
intensive industries in Germany. In what follows, we first describe the construction of the
data set and compare diﬀerent definitions of agglomeration and separation. We then discuss
potential confounding factors and explain how we deal with them in our analysis. Finally, we
run a two-step fixed eﬀect estimation and test for heteroskedasticity with respect to firms in
agglomerations and in separations.
We primarily make use of two data sets for Germany, namely the Mannheim enterprise
panel (MUP) and the Mannheim innovation panel (MIP), both located at the Centre for
European Economic Research, Mannheim (ZEW). The MUP is constructed from credit rating
data collected by Creditreform, the largest credit rating firm in Germany. The data base is
supposed to contain all firms active in Germany at a given time. The MIP is a subset of these
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firms selected from research intensive NACE3 industries.13 For the purpose of our analysis,
the natural locational unit is a labor market region. We use the specification developed by
Eckey et al. (1991) from commuting data, which is the specification currently used in all
German policy studies.
Towards defining whether a labor market region is an agglomeration or a separation, we
employed the 2003 MUP data to determine for each of the research intensive NACE3 indus-
tries the number of firms per labor market region. We considered five alternative definitions
of agglomeration and separation and settled on the following: first, we specify a separation to
be a labor market region housing just one firm belonging to the particular NACE3 industry.
We justify this narrow definition of separation as one excluding, in line with the assump-
tions made in our model, the swap of specialized labor across firms. Second, we deviate
slightly from the theoretical model by defining a labor market region as an agglomeration
if it houses two or more firms belonging to the NACE3 industry. Focusing on regions with
exactly two firms would be closer to the theoretical model, but it would reduce the number
of observations substantially. Instead, we establish the link between theory and empirics by
requiring that the concentration of industry employment in the region exceeds a Hirschman-
Herfindahl-Index (HHI) of 0.18 and that at least one per cent of the country’s labor force
in the industry works in the region. These two criteria are imposed in order to ensure that
the labor force is concentrated in a small number of sizable firms rather than spread over
many small firms of equal size. The regions classified as agglomerations are thus likely to
be characterized by a high degree of imperfect competition in the labor market, a central
ingredient of the theoretical model.14 Appendix 2 contains a brief description of the two data
sets, our procedure for the sample selection, a discussion of the definitions of agglomeration
and separation, and summary statistics on the selected sample. Since estimations based on
the alternative definitions of agglomeration and separation led to similar results, we do not
report them here. Details are available upon request.
One could expect that a host of factors confounds location choice and the volume and
variance of per employee R&D expenditures across firms and time. Therefore, a simple com-
parison of the variance of per capita R&D expenditures in agglomerations and separations
could be misleading as long as, e.g., firm size varies across the two location types and the
variance of per capita R&D expenditures depends on firm size.15
13For a detailed description see Rammer et al. (2005).
14This HHI was computed from the MUP data base. The rationale behind the cutoﬀ value of 0.18 is that
the U.S. Department of Justice considers an industry as concentrated if the HHI for turnover exceeds 0.18.
15As a benchmark we included the result of this simple approach in Figure 4 in the appendix. Each
point in this figure represents, for a particular NACE3 industry, the (raw) standard deviation of per capita
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We therefore control (i) for firm size by including a polynomial in the number of employees
additional to considering per capita R&D expenditures, (ii) for diﬀerences across industries
by including industry fixed eﬀects, (iii) for firm age by including age dummies, (iv) for the
firms’ skill composition by including the fraction of employees with a higher education degree,
(v) for changes over time by including a time trend, and (vi) for possible diﬀerences between
East and West Germany that date back to the 1989 reunification by including a dummy for
East Germany.
In accordance with our hypothesis, we then posit that once we control for all these factors
any remaining, unexplained diﬀerence between the R&D variance of firms in agglomeration
and separation can be attributed to the strategic R&D portfolio eﬀect elaborated in Section
3. To capture this diﬀerence, we proceed in two steps. First we regress firms’ annual per
capita R&D expenditures on those control variables plus dummies for agglomeration and
separation using MIP data from 1992 to 2004 and a fixed eﬀects estimator.16 We then
calculate the residual from this estimation and regress its square on the location indicators,
controlling again for the same factors. This procedure can be understood as a refined version
of a test for heteroskedasticity, testing the hypothesis that the variance of per capita R&D
expenditures is higher for firms in agglomeration than for firms in separation.17
Table 1 reports the results for diﬀerent specifications of the first stage regression. In
specifications (1) to (3) the polynomial of firm size (as measured by number of employees)
is increased from third to fifth order. The first two models indicate that this polynomial
is significant up to the 4th order term. By contrast, adding a fifth order term in column
(3) leads to a drop in significance for all polynomial coeﬃcients. We therefore chose the
specification from (2) to control for firm size. In column (4) we report the results of this
second specification with age dummies included. Firm age is highly correlated with firm size
in our sample. As a result the coeﬃcients hardly change from (2) to (4) and the age dummies
are insignificant. At the same time we lose some observations because age information is not
available for all firms. For these reasons, we chose to use specification (2) for the second
stage of the estimation. Note that using any of the other three specifications did not make a
innovation expenditure of firms in agglomeration and separation. The dominant share of vector points is
located above the 45 degree line, indicating again that firms’ per capita R&D expenditures exhibit more
variation in agglomerations than in separations.
16We used the conventional within regression estimator. For all specifications a Hausman test indicates that
a random eﬀects model is not appropriate relative to the chosen fixed eﬀects specification.
17A conventional test for heteroskedasticity would test whether, in general, the variance depends on exoge-
nous variables. Here, we would like to test whether, conditional on a set of controls, the variance is higher in
agglomerations than in separations.
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significant diﬀerence for our second stage results. While we are not primarily interested in the
per capita levels of R&D expenditure, the results in Table 1 indicate that R&D expenditures
increase in the firm size and in the fraction of employees with a higher education degree. The
coeﬃcient of the indicator variable for agglomeration is negative but insignificant throughout.
The value of R2 is low in all four specifications, which reflects the fact that we explain most
of the variation in firms’ R&D expenditure by using R&D expenditure per capita as the
dependent variable.
In the second stage of our estimation we use the squared residual of specification (2) as
the dependent variable and test whether and in which way the indicator variables for agglom-
eration and separation help to explain the variance in R&D expenditure. Table 2 contains
the results for three diﬀerent specifications. Column (1) contains the simplest possible spec-
ification which regresses the R&D residuals on the firms’ location indicator. This yields a
highly significant, positive coeﬃcient for the agglomeration indicator variable. According to
our definition of this variable, this means that firms in an agglomeration display a higher
variance of R&D expenditure (as measured by the residuals) relative to firms being located
neither in agglomeration nor separation. The second column additionally includes an indi-
cator for East Germany, a time trend and industry dummies. With this specification the
coeﬃcient for separation is negative, the coeﬃcient for agglomeration is positive and both
coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 1 % level). The regression in column
(3) adds the firm size polynomial and firms’ skill composition. Again, all terms of the size
polynomial prove to be significant, the sign of their coeﬃcient hint at a highly non-linear re-
lationship between firm size and R&D residuals. The skill composition coeﬃcient is positive
and significant indicating a positive relationship between firms’ human capital and the R&D
residuals.
The hypothesis we want to test with these results is that the R&D expenditure residuals
for firms in agglomeration are higher compared to firms in separation. Formally, we ask
whether the coeﬃcient of the indicator variable for separation is greater than or equal to the
coeﬃcient for agglomeration. Table 3, which presents the main results of this section, reports
the coeﬃcient diﬀerences and the corresponding one-sided p-test values for the three diﬀerent
specifications of Table 2. The first row gives the values for the full sample and shows that
the null hypothesis is clearly rejected for all specifications. This result is strong support in
favor of the R&D portfolio eﬀect identified in our theoretical model.
We performed various robustness checks with respect to this result and report one par-
ticularly insightful test at this point. Our theory is based on labor pooling. If the results
from row 1 of Table 3 are due to the R&D portfolio eﬀect, then we would expect that the
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
indicator for separation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
indicator for agglomeration -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
indicator for eastern Germany -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003)+ (0.003)+ (0.003)+ (0.003)+
million employees -1.096 -1.725 -0.968 -1.741
(0.210)** (0.365)** (0.579)+ (0.377)**
million employees sq. 6.942 18.492 -22.001 18.673
(1.552)** (5.710)** (24.732) (5.857)**
million employees cu. -10.605 -67.763 449.782 -68.429
(2.575)** (27.318)* (308.778) (27.892)*
million employees qu. 77.144 -2,113.324 77.902
(36.706)* (1,302.273) (37.391)*
million employees 5th order 2,745.434
(1,631.562)+
fraction of empl. with higher 46.941 46.458 46.990 47.161
education (×106) (18.926)* (18.922)* (18.922)* (19.097)*
NACE3 indicators yes yes yes yes
year indicators yes yes yes yes
firm age dummies up to 9 years no no no yes
observations 10,115 10,115 10,115 9,969
number of firms 3,708 3,708 3,708 3,668
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 1: The dependent variable is the firm’s annual per capita innovation expenditure. We
controlled for firm fixed eﬀects. The coeﬃecient of the fraction of employees with a higher
education degree has been multiplied by 106.
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(1) (2) (3)
indicator for separation (×1, 000) 0.000 -0.577 -0.410
(0.201) (0.205)** (0.203)*
indicator for agglomeration (×1, 000) 0.473 0.314 0.112
(0.093)** (0.094)** (0.094)
indicator for eastern Germany (×1, 000) -0.139 -0.175
(0.075)+ (0.076)
million employees 0.218
(0.024)**
million employees sq. -2.477
(0.419)**
million employees cu. 8.967
(1.977)**
million employees qu. -10.062
(2.634)**
fraction employees with higher education (×106) 12.278
(1.596)**
NACE3 indicators no yes yes
year indicators no yes yes
observations 10,115 10,115 10,115
R-squared 0.00 0.05 0.07
standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2: Coeﬃcient estimates obtained from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is
the squared residual from the Column (2) estimate reported in Table 1. The coeﬃcients of
the first three and the last variable have been multiplied by 1000 and 106, respectively, as
indicated in parentheses behind the variable names.
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(1) (2) (3)
diﬀ. p-value diﬀ. p-value diﬀ. p-value
full sample 0.465 0.016 0.891 0.000 0.522 0.008
≥20% higher ed. 0.688 0.012 1.636 0.000 0.904 0.026
<20% higher ed. 0.256 0.006 0.371 0.000 0.094 0.119
standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3: Estimated diﬀerence between the variance in agglomerations and separations as
well as p-values for the hypothesis that the variance of the residuals in agglomeration is
smaller than or equal to the residuals in separation. The residuals were obtained from the
specification in column (2) of Table 1. The columns correspond to the specifications in Table
2. The subsamples are defined by the mean fraction of employees with a higher education
degree. This fraction has been calculated on the industry level across firms and time using
the number of employees as weights.
results are stronger - or at least not weaker - in industries with a highly specialized labor
force. We test this by comparing the results when the sample is split into two subsamples,
industries with a highly specialized labor force and other industries. We follow Rosenthal
and Strange (2001) and use the percentage of employees with a higher education degree as
a proxy for the degree of specialization of the labor force. Rows 2 and 3 of Table 3 report,
respectively, the diﬀerences and p-test values for industries with at least 20 per cent higher
education employees and industries with less than that. The results are compelling. The
diﬀerence between the agglomeration and separation coeﬃcient is in all three specifications
much higher for firms with a highly specialized workforce compared to the full sample (by
47.9% for (1), by 83.0% for (2) and by 73.1% for (3)). Remarkably, both subsamples have
low p-test values comparable to the full sample lending additional, strong empirical support
for our hypothesis.
A last issue that deserves some discussion concerns the possible endogeneity of the location
decision. The theoretical analysis suggests that firms’ location decision depends on their R&D
technology, implying that firms in agglomerations and separations might have diﬀerent R&D
technologies. If so, this would influence our results, as the R&D technology aﬀects the level
and the variance in R&D expenditures. Controlling for a number of firm characteristics that
can be expected to correlate with the R&D technology, such as size and skill composition
of the labor force, also mitigates the endogeneity problem. Therefore, we argue that the
problem is likely not to be severe in the above analysis. Taking the possible endogeneity fully
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into account in the estimation procedure is beyond the scope of this paper, and it is left for
future research.
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5 Conclusions
We have developed a model demonstrating some central trade-oﬀs involved in the location
decision of research intensive firms. A joint location induces the formation of a large labor
pool for firms to draw from. This allows a firm with a successful R&D project to expand
its production more than under separate locations, which works as an agglomerative force.
At the same time, however, wages increase via tougher competition for workers, which is a
deglomerative force.
From our analysis it emerges that firms tend to agglomerate when the equilibrium prob-
abilities of R&D success are low. This is, for instance, the case when it is very costly to
increase the success probability. We show that the ex-ante identical firms generically choose
asymmetric R&D investments to avoid the tough labor market competition resulting from
joint R&D success. This contributes to a higher variance of R&D eﬀorts in agglomerations; a
prediction shown to be consistent with data from German firms in R&D intensive industries.
Turning to welfare, agglomeration leads to two distinct advantages compared to separa-
tion. First, all labor is put to its most productive use under agglomeration but not necessarily
under separation. Second, firms choose a more eﬃcient portfolio of R&D projects under ag-
glomeration. Whence the first eﬀect also arises in models of exogenous productivity shocks
such as Krugman (1991a), the R&D portfolio eﬀect results from the firms’ endogenous choice
of R&D strategy. The eﬀect is novel to the literature on labor pooling and represents one of
the main insights of the paper.
In Gerlach et al. (2005) we study another important dimension of firms’ R&D strate-
gies, namely how ambitious a R&D project to target. A variant of the model is considered
where firms strategically choose, at given research outlay, the risk-return profile of their R&D
project. It shown that firms in agglomerations choose projects of diﬀerent risk-return pro-
files. The asymmetric R&D strategies result also here in a more eﬃcient R&D program at the
industry level confirming the robustness of the R&D portfolio eﬀect identified in this paper.
In our model firms always take the welfare maximizing R&D choices conditional upon
location. Furthermore, as agglomeration in a cluster is welfare maximizing but not always the
equilibrium outcome, the policy recommendation is to leave firms’ R&D activities untouched,
but to subsidize the formation of a cluster in situations where firms tend to stay apart; for
instance in form of a tax break, or favorable land prices.18 However, as usual, the welfare
18Such policies are widely used. For instance, the French government announced recently a policy initiative
aimed at supporting six globally competitive clusters and no less than 61 ”poles of competitiveness” (The
Financial Times, 13.07.05). The financial incentives available to these ”poles” are 1.5bn EUR, and the policies
include subsidies to infrastructure investments but also R&D subsidies.
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improving implementation of such a policy requires precise knowledge about the conditions
under which such situations arise.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Consider first a symmetric equilibrium where φA,∗j = φ
A,∗
i = φ
A,∗. Define:
ω1(φi, φ
A,∗) ≡ ∂πAi (φi, φA,∗)/∂φi for φi < φA,∗,
ω2(φi, φ
A,∗) ≡ ∂πAi (φi, φA,∗)/∂φi for φi > φA,∗.
In equilibrium the following necessary conditions need to be satisfied:
ω1(φi, φ
A,∗) ≥ 0 for φi → (φA,∗)− and
ω2(φi, φ
A,∗) ≤ 0 for φi → (φA,∗)+.
These conditions ensure that φA,∗i = φ
A,∗ is a local maximum for φA,∗j = φ
A,∗. We have that
lim
φi→(φA,∗)−
[ω1(φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗)]− lim
φi→(φA,∗)+
[ω2(φ
A,∗
i φ
A,∗)]
= −ρ(φA,∗)2∆0(φA,∗).
Therefore, there is no symmetric equilibrium if∆0(φA,∗) > 0. Suppose instead that∆0(φA,∗) =
0. The first-order derivative of πAi (φi, φj) is then continuous at φ
A,∗
i = φ
A,∗, which implies
that πAi (φi, φ
A,∗) is globally concave in φi. For ∆0(φ
A,∗) = 0 the first-order condition (7) is
thus both a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
to exist.
(ii) Consider now asymmetric equilibria where φA,∗i < φ
A,∗
j . The first-order conditions (5)
and (6) are necessary for an equilibrium to exist. We need to establish that if there exist
(φA,∗i , φ
A,∗
j ) satisfying the first-order conditions, there exist no profitable deviations for the
two firms. Consider firm i. Since the profit function of firm i is concave for φi ≤ φ
A,∗
j and
(5) is satisfied, there exists no profitable deviation to φi ≤ φ
A,∗
j . Instead consider a deviation
to φi > φ
A,∗
j . From symmetry follows that
∂πAj (φi, φj)/∂φj |(φi,φj)=(φA,∗i ,φA,∗j )= ∂π
A
i (φi, φj)/∂φi |(φi,φj)=(φA,∗j ,φA,∗i )= 0.
Since πAi (φi, φj) is concave for φi > φj , this implies that
∂πAi (φi, φj)/∂φi |(φi,φj)=(φA,∗j +ε,φA,∗i )≤ 0
for all ε > 0. Finally, as ∂2πAi (φi, φj)/∂φi∂φj < 0, we have that
∂πAi (φi, φj)/∂φ
A
i < 0 |(φi,φj)=(φA,∗j +ε,φA,∗j ) ∀ε > 0.
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Continuity of πAi (φi, φj) then implies that there exists no profitable deviation to φi > φ
A,∗
j .
A similar argument establishes that firm j neither has an incentive to deviate.
Existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium is established in the proof of Part (i) of
Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) In a symmetric equilibrium the first-order conditions (5) and (6) collapse into (7). It follows
directly from a comparison of (4) and (7) that φA,∗ ≥ φS,∗ if and only if ρ(φA,∗) ≤ 1/2.
The profits from R&D investment are ρ(φS,∗)∆(φS,∗)L/2 − g(φS,∗) under separation and
πAi (φ
A,∗, φA,∗) under agglomeration. Using φA,∗ ≥ φS,∗, it follows that the profits from R&D
investment are highest under agglomeration for ρ(φA,∗) ≤ 1/2 as
ρ(φS,∗)∆(φS,∗)L/2− g(φS,∗) ≤ πAi (φS,∗, φA,∗) ≤ πAi (φA,∗, φA,∗).
A similar argument establishes that profits from innovation are highest under separation for
ρ(φA,∗) > 1/2.
(ii) It follows directly from a comparison of the first-order conditions (4) and (5) that φA,∗i ≥
φS,∗ if and only if ρ(φA,∗j ) ≤ 1/2. Since φ
A,∗
i = φ
S,∗ if ρ(φA,∗j ) = 1/2, we have that
ρ(φS,∗)∆(φS,∗)L/2− g(φS,∗) = πAi (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ).
The fact that firm j earns higher equilibrium profits than firm i and ∂πAi (φi, φj)/∂ρ(φj) =
−ρ(φi)∆(φi)L < 0 imply that
ρ(φS,∗)∆(φS,∗)L/2− g(φS,∗) ≤ πAi (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j ) < π
A
j (φ
A,∗
i , φ
A,∗
j )
if and only if ρ(φA,∗j ) ≤ 1/2.
(iii) and (iv) Denote by E(πAj ) the expected profits of firm j under agglomeration. Notice
that E(πAj ) is bounded from above and from below by the expected profits from R&D of the
high and of the low investment firm, respectively. Reformulating the profits under separation
shows that v − u merely shifts profits, and bears no impact on the determination of φj .
Hence a unique level of v − u exists above which separation is preferred by firm j. Denote
this threshold level ψj . Moreover, ψj is positive if firm j’s expected profits from its R&D
investment are greater under agglomeration than under separation. Similarly, ψj is negative,
implying that the firm j prefers separation, if the expected profits from the R&D investment
are lower under agglomeration. Applying the same argument to firm i and assuming that the
firms can coordinate on a jointly preferred location outcome establish the results reported.
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Proof of Proposition 4
(i) To ensure a strictly globally concave welfare function we assume throughout our analysis
that
(i) Wii,Wjj < 0,
(ii) WiiWjj −WijWji > 0,
where Wij = ∂2W/∂φi∂φj . As can be easily checked, both conditions are satisfied if g(·) is
suﬃciently convex.
The equilibrium and the welfare maximizing R&D investments solve the same first-order
conditions, (5) and (6). Since the welfare function is globally concave under the assumption
that g(·) is suﬃciently convex, there exists a unique (φA,∗i , φA,∗j ) that solves the first-order
conditions (modulo firm symmetry). Hence, we can also conclude that there exists one and
only one pair that solves the equilibrium conditions of Proposition 2.
(ii) We have that
WS(φS,∗, φS,∗) ≤WA(φS,∗, φS,∗) ≤WA(φA,∗i , φ
A,∗
j )
where the first inequality follows from the welfare analysis of the benchmark model presented
in section 2. This proves the second part of the proposition.
6 Appendix 2: Data Descriptions
We started from the full panel of MIP firms which we observe from 1992 to 2004. This panel
consists of 30,275 observations across firms and time. We dropped observations with miss-
ing information on turnover, missing per capita innovation expenditures or with more than
500,000 employees. We also excluded research institutes (NACE 731 and 732), outliers and
miscodes. Outliers are defined as obervations where the per capita innovation expenditures
exceed 10 times the industry average, firms whose innovation expenditures exceeded their
turnover, and firms for which the year of birth was before 1000AD. In total, we dropped
10,340 observations.
We considered several definitions of separation and agglomeration which we summarize
in Table 4. Naturally, the five definitions overlap. Table 5 contains the correlation between
the definitions in the entire pooled MIP data set before dropping any observations. While
the definitions of separation all correlate highly with each other, the first definition of ag-
glomeration correlates badly with all other definitions because it is too restrictive. The weak
correlation between definitions 2 and 4/5 shows that including additional restrictions in the
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definition separation agglomeration
no. 1 only 1 firm exactly 2 firms
no. 2 only 1 firm 2 or more firms
no. 3 1 or 2 firms 3 or more firms
no. 4 only 1 firm or less than 0.01 per cent 2 or more firms and at least 1 per cent
of the employees of the industry of the employees of the industry and a
HHI exceeding 0.18
no. 5 only 1 firm 2 or more firms and at least 1 per cent
of the employees of the industry and a
HHI exceeding 0.18
Table 4: Alternative definitions of separation and agglomeration, respectively.
latter is important as it helps to distinguish regions with a reasonable degree of labor market
competition, which we try to identify, from regions in which there are simply many small
firms as it could be the case for definition 2. At any rate, our results turn out to be robust
with respect of the definition that was chosen.
Summary statistics across firms and years of the data set used for the analysis are con-
tained in Tables 6 through 8.
Figure 4 shows the standard deviation of per capita innovation expenditure in agglomer-
ations plotted against standard deviation in separations before controlling for firm character-
istics. Agglomeration and separation are defined according to definition 5 in Table 4.
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agglomeration no. 1 no. 2 no. 3 no. 4 no. 5
no. 1 1
no. 2 0.1345 1
no. 3 -0.2308 0.9331 1
no. 4 -0.0548 0.3519 0.3654 1
no. 5 -0.0548 0.3519 0.3654 1 1
separation no. 1 no. 2 no. 3 no. 4 no. 5
no. 1 1
no. 2 1 1
no. 3 0.6851 0.6851 1
no. 4 0.8411 0.8411 0.6855 1
no. 5 1 1 0.6851 0.8411 1
Table 5: Correlation between definitions of separation and agglomeration based on the full
MIP data set.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
year 19,935 1,998.436 3.742349 1,992 2,004
number of employees 19,935 1,150.42 9878.368 1 44,6800
innovation expenditures 19,935 33.83918 349.9453 0 13,164.69
per capita R&D expenditures 19,935 0.0100784 0.0207005 0 0.3852586
percentage of employees 10,115 31.84532 28.65605 0 100
with higher education degree
Table 6: Summary statistics of the data set used.
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Figure 4: Standard deviation of per capita innovation expenditure in agglomerations plotted
against standard deviation in separations.
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year separation no. 5 agglomeration no. 5
1992 46 200
1993 45 220
1994 50 351
1995 50 287
1996 33 211
1997 38 208
1998 45 295
1999 46 275
2000 56 322
2001 42 237
2002 64 340
2003 65 346
2004 58 299
Total 638 3,591
Table 7: Number of firms by year and location type.
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NACE3 sep. aggl.
Manufacture of refined petroleum products 0 5
Manufacture of basic chemicals 44 153
Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products 11 8
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 37 114
Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 16 93
preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations
Manufacture of other chemical products 15 129
Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of 23 234
mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines
Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 21 247
Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 14 20
Manufacture of machine-tools 14 85
Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 0 94
Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 6 3
Manufacture of oﬃce machinery and computers 1 37
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 10 70
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 39 68
Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 2 15
Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 33 122
Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c. 6 54
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 28 121
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and 34 91
apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 30 47
recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 0 119
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 31 187
checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except
industrial process control equipment
Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 37 71
Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 31 159
Manufacture of motor vehicles 32 78
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 31 138
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 20 48
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 31 69
Software consultancy and supply 2 186
Data processing 15 67
Data base activities 3 10
Architectural and engineering activities and related 0 504
technical consultancy
Technical testing and analysis 21 145
Total 638 3,591
Table 8: Number of firms by NACE3 class and location type.
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